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The aging population has raised at least two concerns about tax policy. First, taxes will 
need to be increased to cover higher public-pension and medical-care expenses when 
baby boomers have retired. Second, taxes can be cut in the meantime, as the government 
realizes the "fiscal dividend" that accompanies its debt reduction program (that has been 
motivated by the aging population development). This paper uses a simple endogenous 
growth analysis to examine these issues. It is assumed that sales tax increases are 
infeasible on political grounds. Two conclusions emerge: the income tax rate levied on 
domestic residents should be cut during the debt-reduction period, and the tax rate on 
foreigners whose capital is operating in Canada should be increased later on when the 
bulk of the baby boomers have retired. 
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The aging population has raised at least two concerns about tax policy. On the one 
hand, there is the belief that the increased old-age dependency ratio will mean that 
governments will need to raise taxes to meet the increased costs of the public pension and 
medical-care programs. If so, a major policy issue is: which taxes should be raised? On 
the other hand, the federal government is attempting to partially insulate material living 
standards from the burden of the aging population by pursuing debt reduction now. The 
government has motivated its target of a 20% debt-to-GDP ratio (to be reached by 2020) 
on the basis of the aging population challenge. The idea is that lower debt interest 
payment obligations on the government’s part will permit some tax cuts. These tax cuts 
can increase living standards and provide a cushion in the face of the threat to living 
standards that the aging population represents. A major policy issue is: which taxes 
should be cut as debt reduction proceeds?  
Whether our focus is on the time period between now and 2030, when the bulk of 
the baby boomers will reach retirement, or after 2030, the same broad fiscal policy 
question emerges. Which form of taxation should be cut as we collect the “fiscal 
dividend” of debt reduction in the near future, and which form of taxation should be 
increased later on as the aging-baby-boomer phenomenon really sets in. Of course, public 
economics specialists have studied the efficiency and equity aspects of alternative forms 
of taxation for many years, and a consensus has emerged. Most economists (for example, 
Mintz (2001)) favour a progressive expenditure tax as the preferred form of taxation. Our   3
existing income tax system represents a partial acceptance of this consensus view. With 
the RRSP program and the fact that home owners pay no capital gains taxes on their 
principal residences, a significant part of household saving is tax exempt, and the 
resulting income-tax system is part way to being a consumption-based tax system.  
Where does the corporate profits tax fit within this consensus view? If it were not 
for the fact that foreigners own some of the capital that is employed within our borders, 
this view calls for the elimination of the corporate tax. This advice is based on the 
presumption that it is inefficient and unfair to subject profit income to “double” taxation 
– at both the corporate and personal levels. But elimination of the corporate tax would 
mean that our government was giving up revenue that has been paid by foreigners. Thus, 
it is argued that the corporate tax should be maintained, but with domestic citizens having 
the right to claim – at the personal tax level – a complete rebate for all corporate taxes 
paid on that individual’s behalf. This arrangement would turn the corporate income tax 
into a tax that is levied only on foreign investors. The question that remains is whether 
this tax on foreign-owned capital should be higher or lower than the tax levied on the 
incomes of domestic residents. The purpose of this paper is to use a simple endogenous 
growth model of an open economy to answer this question.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a standard macro 
model that can address this tax-policy question is explained. In section 3, a revenue-
neutral tax substitution is examined, and it is shown that efficiency is enhanced, while 
equity is not compromised, if the personal income tax on domestics is cut, and this 
initiative is financed by an increase in the tax on foreign-owned capital. This result 
suggests that we should cut the taxes paid by domestics now – as we enjoy the fiscal   4
dividend of debt reduction – and that we should not reverse these tax cuts later on. 
Instead, we should raise the tax on foreign capital, when we need to finance the increased 
entitlements to the public pension and medical-care programs in the longer term. We 
relate this conclusion more specifically to existing studies, and offer concluding remarks, 
in section 4.  
  
2. A Simple Growth Model  
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 144-146) have suggested that we can consider a 
model of economic growth involving both physical and human capital, without 
complexity, if we assume that the same production process can be used to produce all 
items in the economy (both forms of capital, private consumption goods, and government 
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where the variables are: Y – output, K – physical capital (owned entirely by the rich 
segment of the population), and H – human capital (owned by both the rich and the poor 
segments of the population – in equal shares).  
The economy’s resource constraint is  
  . Ω + + + + + + = H K X G E C Y & &  
This equation states that output takes the form of: C – consumption by rich households, 
plus E – expenditures by poor households, plus G – government programs, plus X – 
export sales to citizens in the rest of the world, plus capital accumulation (increases in K 
and H (the dots indicate time derivatives)). In addition to these uses, the remainder of the   5
country’s GDP is used to cover the transactions costs that must be incurred to satisfy 
foreign investors. These costs, denoted by Ω, are discussed below.    
  The government budget constraint is 
 . ) ( rF wH F K r G λ τ τ + + − =   
This equation states that there is no government debt, and that the budget is balanced at 
each point in time. Program spending is financed by two proportional income taxes. The 
first is levied on the income of domestic citizens. This tax rate, τ, is levied on the 
earnings citizens receive from renting out physical capital, and this is represented by the 
first term on the right-hand side. F is the amount of the domestically employed physical 
capital that is owned by foreigners. This leaves (K – F) as the amount owned by 
domestics. The domestic income tax rate, τ, is also levied on the earnings domestic 
citizens receive from renting out their human capital (the second term on the right-hand 
side). The remaining new notation is: r – the rental rate earned by physical capital, w  – 
the rent earned by human capital. Both rich and poor domestics pay tax rate τ. The third 
term on the right-hand side of the government budget constraint is the revenue received 
by taxing foreigners. Their rents from their holdings of physical capital, rF, are taxed at 
rate λ. 
  The remaining equations of the model define optimal behaviour for households 
and firms. Rich households operate as ever-lasting dynasties. There is no labour-leisure 
choice, so the utility (U) function is simple and standard:  
  ∫
− = dt e C U
t
t
ρ ln  
where ρ is the rate of time preference. Utility maximization leads to two conditions. The 
first is the Ramsey (1928) condition, which is the solution to the consumption-savings   6
choice. Households save if the after-tax return on capital exceeds their rate of impatience, 
and saving makes positive growth in consumption possible. Hence: 
 . ) 1 ( / ρ τ − − = r C C &  
The second optimizing rule is that each household’s portfolio of assets must be in 
equilibrium, and since the rich pay the same tax rate on income from both physical and 
human capital, this requires that  
  . w r =  
We want to have both rich and poor households in the model, so that equity 
aspects of the alternative taxes can be considered. The key difference between rich and 
poor households is that the latter are impatient. Since their time-preference rate exceeds 
the after-tax return on saving, it is never rational for these individuals to save. Thus, these 
households do not acquire the ownership of any physical capital, and this is why they 
remain poor. They do accumulate human capital, but only because they have to. It is 
assumed that there is compulsory attendance in school, so even poor households must 
invest in the human capital that is required to keep a job on an ongoing basis (in a 
balanced-growth equilibrium). Following Mankiw (2000), we assume that half the 
population is poor, so this group owns half the human capital stock . The consumption 
function for these households is simply their budget constraint; they consume all their 
current resources at each point in time, and so (in Mankiw’s terminology) they live 
“hand-to-mouth”. This expenditure function is: 
. 2 / ) 2 / ) 1 ( ( H H w E & − − = τ  
  Profit maximization by firms leads to two standard optimal hiring rules – that 
each factor be hired up to the point that its marginal product just equal its rental price:   7
  r K Y = / α  
  w H Y = / β  
We complete the specification of the model by describing the accumulation 
identity for foreign holdings of capital employed within this economy, and the portfolio 
preferences of the foreign owners of physical capital. The country must allow foreign 
ownership of the physical capital that is employed domestically to increase each period 
by exactly the amount that its rent payments to foreigners that period (denoted by r*F) 
exceeds that period’s earnings achieved through export sales: 
. * X F r F − = &  
r* is the net interest rate on physical capital that this country pays out to foreign owners. 
This net yield is smaller than the pre-tax yield in the economy, r, for two reasons. First, 
foreigners must pay the withholding tax, levied at rate λ. Second, the transactions costs 
that are incurred to inform foreigners sufficiently to make them comfortable investing 
outside their own country must be covered. Following Van der Ploeg (1996) and others, 
we assume that these transactions costs are proportional to the “foreign indebtedness” 
level of the country (that is proportional to the F/K ratio). Hence, assuming interest 
arbitrage, we have the following relationship between domestic and foreign interest rates: 
 . / * ) 1 ( K F r r θ λ + = −    
 We cannot assume perfect international capital mobility, since this specification makes 
the domestic interest rate over-determined. In this case, the domestic interest rate is 
pinned down both by (exogenous) domestic technology parameters (as explained below) 
and by the (exogenous) foreign interest rate – a problem first emphasized by Milbourne 
(1995). In his survey article on endogenous growth in open economies, Turnovsky (2002)   8
notes that this problem can be overcome in several ways – such as by allowing for 
adjustment costs for capital or for a labour-leisure choice. Burbidge and Scarth (1995) 
solve this problem by imposing a finite lifetime (planning horizon) for households. But 
the most common strategy is to specify less than perfect capital mobility, as in Van der 
Ploeg, so we follow that practice here.  
  We are now in a position to specify the transactions-cost term in the economy’s 
resource constraint. We assume that this term is given by 
  F K F ) / (θ = Ω  
To overcome the increased risk (due to incomplete knowledge) that foreign investors 
expose themselves to when employing their capital in another country, domestic agents 
must spend resources equal to  ) / ( K F θ  per unit of capital. Since foreigners are 
increasingly concerned about the security of their investment the more heavily “indebted” 
the country already is, we follow convention and specify this cost to be proportional to 
the foreign-ownership proportion.    
  This model can be specified in a more compact form, and the remainder of this 
section is devoted to explaining how. First, the equal-yield condition for the rich and the 
two optimal hiring rules imply 
 . / ) 1 ( / α α − = K H  
Second, the production function can be divided through by K, and then this expression for 
the H/K ratio can be substituted in. The result is 
  AK Y =  
where 
 . ) / ) 1 ((
1 α α α γ
− − = A    9
We see that the model has the detailed structure that has been outlined above, while at the 
same time, it can be solved as simply as the traditional “AK” model. The yield on both 
forms of capital is independent of tax policy since 
  . A w r α = =  
  We explain below that a standard property of this class of models – that there is 
no transitional dynamics – applies in this case. Thus, the system is always in its balanced-
growth equilibrium. Balanced growth means that C, E, Y, K, H and F all grow at the same 
rate. Several of the model’s equations can be re-written so that this balanced-growth 
condition ) / / / / ( n F F H H K K C C = = = = & & & &  can be substituted in. First, the 
consumption function of the rich can be re-written as 
 . ) 1 ( ρ τ − − = r n         ( 1 )  
Then, we divide the poor households’ expenditure function through by K, and substitute 
in the (H/K) expression, the balanced-growth assumption, the r = w condition, and 
equation (1). The result is 
  α α ρ 2 / ) 1 ( − = e         ( 2 )  
where  . / K E e =  This equation implies that there is no one-time consumption-level effect 
for poor households when the tax substitution takes place.  
The foreign indebtedness accumulation identity is simplified by dividing this 
relationship through by F and substituting in the balanced growth condition: 
f n r x ) * ( − =  
where x and f denote the X/K and the F/K ratios.    10
The economy’s resource constraint can be re-written in a similar manner. We 
divide this relationship through by K, then substitute in the (H/K) and x expressions (and 
the balanced-growth condition) to get 
  f n f r n e c g A ) * ( ) / ( ) 1 ( − + + + + = − θ α      (3) 
where  Y G g / =  is the ratio of government program spending to GDP. This relationship 
can be further re-expressed by using the interest-arbitrage condition: 
  f r r θ λ + = − * ) 1 (         ( 4 )  
and equation (1) to yield: 
  rg f r e c r f + − + = + − ) ( ) )( 1 ( λ α ρ τ α      (5) 
Finally, the government budget constraint is simplified by dividing through by Y 
and substituting in the optimal hiring rules. The result is 
 . ) ( f g α τ λ τ − + =         ( 6 )  
The model we solve in the next section is a five-equation system: equations (1), (2), (4), 
(5) and (6).  
  Before proceeding to the policy analysis, however, we assess whether there is 
gradual approach to the balanced-growth equilibrium. The fact that ( K H / ) equals  
α α / ) 1 ( −  means that H always grows at the same rate as K. Similarly, since the 
exogenous tax rate, τ, changes only once-for-all, if equations (4) and (6) are combined by 
substituting out the responding tax rate, λ, we see that f can change only once-for-all as 
well. This fact means that F always grows at the same rate as K. Thus, we can assess 
transitional dynamics by replacing n in equation (1) by  C C / & , replacing n in equation (3) 
by , / K K & substituting these relationships into   11
 , / / / K K C C c c & & & − =  
and taking the differential of the result. Since the expression for ( dc c d / & ) that emerges is 
necessarily positive, this unstable force is assumed to be eliminated by a jump in c that 
puts the economy in its balanced-growth equilibrium at the instant that the tax 
substitution occurs. Armed with this knowledge, we proceed to assessing the welfare 
implications of the tax substitution in the next section.   
 
3. Policy Analysis 
The system that was explained and summarized in the preceding section 
determines how five endogenous variables (n, c, e, f and λ) respond when there is an 
assumed change in any of the exogenous variables or parameters (r, r*, g, τ, α, ρ, and θ). 
Since we are interested in a revenue-neutral switch in taxes between domestic and foreign 
owners of domestically employed capital, we consider a once-for-all decrease in the tax 
rate applied to the domestic citizens, τ, that is financed by an increase in the tax rate 
applied to foreigners, λ. We examine the effects of this tax substitution on the growth 
rate of living standards that is shared by all individuals in the economy, n. This is the 
slope of the (log of the) per-capita consumption time path. We also check for the 
existence of any one-time adjustment in the level of this per-capita consumption time 
path (its intercept). Since the physical capital stock cannot jump at a point in time, this 
intercept-shift effect can be determined by assessing whether either c or e respond to the 
tax substitution.   12
  The policy multipliers follow immediately by taking the total differential of 
equations (1), (2), (4), (5) and (6). We evaluate the resulting coefficients from an initial 
situation in which the tax rates are equal. The results are: 
 0 / ) 1 ( / < − − = f f d d α α τ λ  
  0 / < − = r d dn τ          
 0 ) /( ) 1 ( / < − − = f f r d dc αθ α ρ τ     
 0 ) /( ) 1 ( / > − = f f r d df αθ α τ      
  0 / = τ d de      
The first result confirms that the cut in the tax on domestic citizens requires an increase in 
the tax levied on foreign investors. The second result indicates that the increase in the 
after-tax return on saving stimulates increased capital accumulation, and so leads to a 
higher growth rate of domestic living standards for both rich and poor households. The 
third result confirms that this long-term gain does not come at the expense of short-term 
pain. The one-time consumption-level effect for the rich is also an increase. The reason 
for this can be best appreciated by focusing on a simplified version of equation (5). If we 
abstract from government and the existence of the poor households, this equation 
becomes: 
  ]. / ) 1 [( α α ρ K f C − =         ( 7 )  
This is Friedman’s (1957) permanent-income version of the consumption function – with 
consumption proportional to broadly defined wealth (and the rate of time preference 
being the factor of proportionality). As usual, Friedman’s characterization of the wealth-
based approach to the consumption-savings choice is consistent with the Ramsey (1928) 
version (equation (1)). To appreciate this equivalence, it must be remembered that the   13
wealth of domestic citizens is (K – F + H), and (using the  α α / ) 1 ( / − = K H  result and 
the definition of f) this expression can be represented as  ]. / ) 1 [( α α K f −   
  Equation (7) lets us see the intuition behind the result that a cut in the tax on 
domestics has a favourable one-time consumption-level effect. This tax substitution leads 
to a lower level of foreign indebtedness (a lower f), and this outcome implies that there is 
a one-time increase in the ratio of GNP to GDP, ). 1 ( f α −  With higher national income, 
nationals can support a higher level of consumption. So the living standards of the rich 
are improved in both the ongoing-growth-rate and the one-time-level dimensions.  
  The final policy result,  0 / = τ d de , indicates that this good news for the rich does 
not come at the expense of the poor. This other group benefits in the growth-rate sense, 
but these individuals are unaffected in the one-time level sense. This is because this 
group does not hold any physical capital. As a result, the reduction in the foreign 
ownership of physical capital cannot benefit these households.  
  Since the tax substitution helps all domestic households, it appears to be 
recommended. Thus, the question posed in the title of the paper, “Is Foreign-Owned 
Capital a Bad Thing to Tax?” is answered in the negative.  
  There is another way of rationalizing this conclusion. In this model, the tax on 
foreigners causes a redistribution between foreigners and domestic citizens, but it has no 
allocative effect. The productivity of human capital is not affected by who owns the 
physical capital that the human capital works with. But the other tax, the tax on 
domestics, is a distortion; it distorts the households' accumulation of capital decision. On 
efficiency grounds, it is always a good idea to replace a distorting tax with a non-
distorting one. The formal model is useful for two reasons: it confirms this intuition   14
concerning efficiency, and it shows that there is no trade-off between the efficiency and 
the equity aspects of the tax substitution.  
  It would be a mistake to think that the general verdict we have reached hinges on 
the simple “AK” feature of this model. Indeed, the entire endogenous growth aspect can 
be dropped. The growth rate, n, can be taken as an exogenous variable, and the interest 
rate can be made endogenous (determined by the optimal hiring rule,  K Y r / α =  with the 
(Y/K ) ratio not constrained to be constant). In this case, the production function becomes 
, ) (
1 α α γ
− = qL K Y with L being labour time (an exogenous constant) and worker 
productivity, q, growing at the exogenous rate n. With no investment in human capital, 
the expenditure function for poor households becomes  
2 / ) 1 )( 1 ( τ α − − = r e         ( 2 a )  
and the five-equation model (equations (1), (2a), (4), (5) and (6)) determine r, c, e, f and 
λ, instead of n, c, e, f and λ. It is left for the reader to verify two outcomes: that ( τ d dc/ ) 
is again negative, and that ( τ d de/ ) is again zero. Since there can be only consumption-
level effects in this exogenous growth setting, these results confirm our earlier findings as 
much as is possible. In this case, the rich benefit, while the poor do not, when the tax 
burden is shifted toward foreign capitalists – but at least the poor are not harmed by this 
tax substitution.  
 
4. Conclusions 
  Are the results of this analysis relevant to Canadian policy debate? Perhaps the 
best point of reference for answering this question is Mintz’ (2001) prize-winning 
monograph. His focus (for example, p. 17) is on “the costs of doing business in Canada,”   15
and he argues (p. 25) that “capital … and business activities are more mobile today” and 
that “smart” taxation involves respecting this fact of modern economic life. He concludes 
(p. 165) that we should “increase our reliance on taxes that have less impact on Canada’s 
competitiveness” – that is on taxes that “fall on relatively immobile bases.” While Mintz 
does not directly address the tax comparison that is the focus of this paper, it is fair to say 
that many readers may likely conclude that his approach calls for avoiding taxes on 
highly mobile foreign-owned capital. But, as we have seen, our standard analysis does 
not support this application of Mintz’ general proposition. It is for this reason that we 
argue that the analysis makes a contribution to the policy debate.  
  We began the paper by asking which taxes should be cut during Canada’s debt-
reduction years, and which taxes should be raised later on, if necessary, during the peak 
population-aging years. The most central answer to these questions is that it is income 
taxes that should be cut now, and expenditure taxes that should be raised later on. Mintz 
is explicit about this, and there is nothing in the present analysis that challenges this 
conclusion. This paper’s contribution is more limited, since its focus is on what advice 
does standard analysis give when increases in expenditure taxes are deemed to be 
infeasible – on political grounds. If the government must focus only on income taxes, the 
issue becomes whose income tax should be adjusted. We have restricted our attention to 
this second-best question. The analysis suggests that it is the tax rate on domestic 
residents that should be cut during the debt-reduction period, and it is the tax rate on 
foreigners whose capital is operating in Canada that should be increased later on when 
the bulk of the baby boomers have retired.   16
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